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ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING UNDER THE 2003
REVISIONS TO ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE:
CLARIFICATION OR CHAOS?
Juanda Lowder Danielt

I.

SYNOPSIS

In May 2003, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code was
revised to facilitate electronic contracting for the sale of goods. It
now allows a contract to be formed by the interaction of two preprogrammed computers, even though no individual was aware of it.
This article will examine apparent anomalies created by combining
the new electronic contracting provisions with the surviving
provisions of Article 2 and emphasize the need to provide contracting
parties with the opportunity for human intervention before the
contract is formed. After introducing the new provisions and the
potential problems it creates, the article proceeds to analyze whether
allowing contracting between computers comports with the longstanding notion of contractual intent. In addition, the new provisions
are analyzed under Article 2's provisions relating to parol evidence,
output and requirements contracts, and waivers and modifications.
The focus then turns to whether the current common law doctrines of
fraud and mistake afford any relief from contracts formed between
preprogrammed computers. Lastly, the conclusion offers remedial
measures in order to avoid the seemingly unintentional effects
predicted by this article.

t B.A., California State University, Dominquez Hills; J.D., Emory University;
Assistant Professor of Law, University of La Verne College of Law, Ontario, California. I wish
to thank H. Randall Rubin, Charles Doskow and John Linarelli for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this article. All mistakes are mine.
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II. INTRODUCTION
"It was the best of times,
it was the worst of times.. .
At last, the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), Article 2,2
has been revised in order to recognize electronic contract formation
for the sale of goods.3 Unfortunately, in doing so, the drafters
simultaneously created a situation wherein parties utilizing the new
electronic contracting provisions may find themselves bound by
contracts they did not know about and/or subject to contractual terms
which they did not have any ability to review or approve. Moreover,
such parties may find themselves unable to extract themselves from
such contractual relationships under current contract law.
Accordingly, the new electronic contracting provisions tend to leave
one wondering whether the long-awaited revisions to Article 2
created more problems than they solved.
Until the most recent amendments, courts frequently were called
''
upon to determine whether electronic transmissions were "writings
within the ambit of Article 2. How was one to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds' 5 previous requirement of a sufficient writing where the parties6
only corresponded electronically? Was the battle of the forms
rendered inapplicable to mutual agreements consummated by
computer transmission not evidenced by a writing sent within the
definition of U.C.C. section 1-201(36)? 7 Despite the plain language
of the relevant code sections, the U.C.C. was frequently stretched,
twisted and sometimes ignored as judges attempted to bridge the

1.
CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES 1 (Oxford Illustrated Dickens ed., Oxford
University Press 1998) (1859).
2.
Formally entitled Uniform Commercial Code - Sales, Article 2 governs transactions
involving the sale of goods. U.C.C. §§ 2-101, 2-102 (1968).
3. Specifically, U.C.C. § 2-204 was revised to include language authorizing the
formation of a contract for the sale of goods by the interaction of electronic agents, as well as
the interaction of an electronic agent and an individual. U.C.C. § 2-204 (Draft of Article 2
Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
4. The term writing refers to "printing, typewriting, or any other intentional reduction to
tangible form." U.C.C. § 1-201(43) (2002).
5. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1996).
6. Id. § 2-207. This code section governed whether the parties' non-matching writings
created a contract.
7.
U.C.C. § 1-201(36) (2001) provides that a writing is sent when it is deposited in the
mail or delivered for transmission by a usual means of communication. Moreover, former § 2207 referred to "a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance 'sent'...." U.C.C. § 2-207
(1996).
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technology gap between 19518 and the modem era in which the use of
computers and similar electronic transmitting implements have
The decisions
become commonplace in commercial dealings.
rendered under the referenced code sections, as adopted by the
respective states, are as varied on these issues as the men and women
who don the black robes in an attempt to make sense of such matters.
For example, the consensus had been to assume that an email
transmission met the definition of"a writing" under the U.C.C. for the
purpose of satisfying the Statute of Frauds and to focus on whether
the email sufficiently points to the existence of an agreement between
the parties. 9 However, in at least one pre-revision case, the court
term "send" implied a requirement to
determined that use of the
10
deliver a written document.
Even in its pre-revision state, Article 2 was on the cutting-edge
of contract formation by dispensing with the need for certainty in
many of the contractual terms. For example, the absence of a
specified price or delivery date did not prevent the formation of a
valid and enforceable contract. Instead, Article 2 contained "gap
filler" provisions that supplied the missing terms in order to facilitate
Those cutting-edge provisions are
the transaction of business."
retained by the 2003 official version of the U.C.C.
However, on May 13, 2003, the American Law Institute
approved 2amendments to Article 2 that not only substituted the term
"record"' where a writing was previously required, 3 but also allows
contract formation between two electronic agents 14 without the
knowledge or action of an individual.' 5 Thus, parties can bind
8.

The first official version of U.C.C. Article 2 was promulgated in 1951. See Work

Concludes

on

Revision

of

Uniform

Commercial

Code

Articles

2

and

2A,

at

http://www.nccusl.org (May 14, 2003).
9.

See generally John E. Theuman, Annotation, Satisfaction of the Statute of Frauds by

E-mail, 110 A.L.R. 5th 277 (2003).
10. Mut. Sav. & Loan v. Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 462 N.W.2d 797, 799 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990) (decided under U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 but necessarily construing the definition of "sent"
in the general provisions of Article 1).
E.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (1996).
11.
12. This term is defined as information inscribed in a tangible medium or in electronic
form that is retrievable and in perceivable form. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(m) (Draft of Article 2
Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
13.

Id.

14. An electronic agent is defined as "a computer program or an electronic or other
automated means used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or
performances in whole or in part, without review or action by an individual." Id. § 2-103(l)(g).
15. Id. § 2-204(4)(a). It should be noted that this code section also allows formation of a
contract by interaction between an electronic agent and an individual. However, the effect of
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themselves to a contract without the opportunity to learn or approve
of the finals terms. While the advantages of electronic contracting are
plentiful, the drafters may have gone too far by putting too much faith
in automation. The risks associated with engaging in electronic
contracting may actually deter people from utilizing this new
convenience.
This article examines apparent anomalies created by combining
the new electronic contracting provisions with the surviving
provisions of Article 2, and emphasizes the need to provide
contracting parties with the opportunity for human intervention before
the contract is formed. Section II addresses the basics of electronic
contracting, as well as the source of the provisions included in revised
Article 2. Section III explores how contracting through electronic
agents impinges on the long-standing general notions of contractual
intent. Section IV examines how the new electronic formation
provisions appear to render the parol evidence rule inapplicable in
such situations. In Section V, provisions for output and requirements
contracts are analyzed in light of the new revisions removing the
requirement of individual input from the contract formation process.
In Section VI, the applicability of the waiver and modification
provisions to a contract created by electronic agents is questioned.
Section VII focuses on whether certain avoidance doctrines can
provide relief to a party who relies on electronic agents in the
contracting process. Lastly, the conclusion offers remedial measures
in order to avoid the seemingly unintentional effects predicted by this
article.
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING
Electronic contracting is the process whereby offers and16
acceptances are transmitted electronically between the parties.
Article 2 defines the term "electronic" as relating to technology
utilizing
"electrical,
digital,
magnetic,
wireless,
optical,

this provision is not examined in this article. See generally Amendments to Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2-Sales, as approved at the Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute on May 13, 2003, at http://www.ali.org/. The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws previously approved the identical amendments in August 2002. See
Uniform Law Commissioners, Work Concludes on Revision of Uniform Commercial Code
Articles 2 and 2A, at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ltemlD=52 (May 14, 2003).
16. See, e.g., Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9 HARV.
J.L. & TECH 25, 28-29 (1996).
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electromagnetic, or similar capabilities."' 17 Electronic transmission
occurs through a process which breaks the data into a series of smaller
pieces, sends the information over the Internet wherein it travels over
a number of interim computers along the way, and reassembles the
data when it reaches its destination.' 8 In light of the process in which
the electronic data is disassembled upon dispatch and then
reassembled upon arrival at its destination, the potential for
transmission error exists.' 9
In 1999, the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act (UETA) was
promulgated to validate electronic records and signatures in electronic
commerce. 2 A review of the 2003 revisions to Article 2 pertaining to
electronic contracting reveals that many of the definitions and terms
were borrowed from the UETA.2 '
Paradoxically, the UETA
specifically points to the provisions of Article 2 and other long
standing common law principles to determine whether an agreement
exists.2 2 Moreover, the UETA makes it clear that it was never
intended to provide substantive rules of contracting or to affect such
rules.23 This may explain why the inclusion of electronic contracting
provisions into the formation provisions of Article 2 appear to create
chaos.
Even though revised Article 2 was inspired by the UETA with
regard to inclusion of electronic contracting provisions, there are
notable differences between the two acts.
First, the UETA
specifically requires that a party assent to conduct a transaction
electronically in order for the UETA to apply, 24 while Article 2 does
not. Also, the UETA provides the non-waivable right of a party to
refuse to conduct future transactions electronically.
Article 2 does
not specifically provide for the ability to refuse to contract

17.
U.C.C. § 2-103(i)(t) (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual
Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
18.
See, e.g., Paul Fasciano, Note, Internet Electronic Mail: A Last Bastion for the
Mailbox Rule, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 971, 1000 (1997).
19. See Helen H. Richardson, Ecommerce-Does It Make An E-Difference?, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING IN TODAY"S "E-CONOMY", A.L.I. - A.B.A. COURSE OF
STUDY, 55, 82 (May 30-31, 2002).

20.

Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, prefatory note (1999).

21.
See also U.C.C. § 2-204 cmt. 4 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I.
Annual Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
22.

Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 2(1) & cmt. 1 (1999).

23. "It is NOT a general contracting statute-the substantive rules of contracts remain
unaffected by UETA." Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, prefatory note (1999).
24.

Id. § 5(b).

25.

Id. § 5(c).
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electronically. In fact, Article 2 specifically validates any action
performed by an electronic agent by attributing such action to the
parties. 26 However, the correlating UETA provision regarding
attribution of an electronic record to a party does not specifically
mention acts of an electronic agent.27 Moreover, while the UETA
acknowledges and attempts to deal with the possibility of change or
error occurring in an electronic transmission,2 8 Article 2 contains no
parallel provision. From all indications, the UETA was depending on
the continued existence of the then-existing Article 2 provisions,
which included the common law notions of contractual intent, in
order to complement the UETA. Also, it is important to note not
every state has adopted the UETA.2 9
The electronic contracting provisions of the UETA and the
newly revised Article 2 appear to contemplate situations where the
parties will program their respective computers to initiate and/or
respond to electronic orders within certain predetermined parameters.
The problem is the majority of Article 2 provisions that survived the
2003 revisions continue to operate in a world that at least ostensibly
requires human intervention at some point during the contract
formation stage to have an enforceable agreement. The fact that the
revised Article 2 neither requires that a party assent beforehand to
contract through electronic agents nor requires that the parties be
afforded an opportunity to review the actions of an electronic agent
during the contract formation stage may prove to be an
insurmountable hindrance to e-commerce transactions.
IV. COMMON LAW REQUIREMENT OF OBJECTIVE MANIFESTATION
OF CONTRACTUAL INTENT

Despite the surviving factions of resistance, most academicians
and law makers agree that contractual intent is based on the parties'
26. U.C.C. § 2-212 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual Meeting
May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
27. It should be noted that the comments for UETA do reference actions of the electronic
agent even though the reference is conspicuously absent from the main text of the Act. See
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 9 cmt. 1 (1999). The significance of the absence of
specific reference from the actual code, but inclusion in the comments is left to the interpreting
courts.

28. See Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 10 (1999).
29. As of this date, 43 states have adopted some version of the UETA, and two states
have legislation pending to adopt it. See Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the
Uniform Electronics Transaction Act,

http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp (last visited Dec. 9,
2003).
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objective manifestation of assent to certain and definite terms. 30 The
U.C.C. defines a "party" as a person engaging in a transaction or
making an agreement within the Act. 3 1 The U.C.C. further defines a
"person" as an individual, organization or other legal entity.32
Although the official comments make it clear that the term "party"
also includes a person acting through an agent, it also provides for
careful scrutiny of situations where an agent acts in opposition to his
principal.3 3 Thus, a principal may avoid a contract if he establishes
that the purported agent lacked the authority 34 to enter into the
contract.35 Likewise, a party may avoid a contract if he can establish
that his intent to contract was hampered by mistake, fraud, duress or
undue influence.36
Enter the computer age with its tremendous advantage of
instantaneous communication. Even as far back as the era of
mainframe technology, businesspersons embraced the idea of
conducting business via electronic transmissions. However, when the
deals made by the technologically savvy pioneers went awry,
attorneys and judges alike were faced with a statutory scheme, the
U.C.C., which was ill-equipped to govern disputes arising out of
contracting through electronic transmissions.37 While the plain
language of the then-existing Article 2 ostensibly precluded an
38
electronic transmission from meeting the definition of a "writing,
courts generally glossed over the Code's language in an apparent

30. E.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6 (3d ed. 1999); Common law
principles are specifically incorporated into Article 2 unless they have been displaced by other
provisions. U.C.C. § 1-103 (2002).
31.

U.C.C. § 1-201(26) (2002).

32.
33.

Id. § 1-201(27).
Id. § 1-201(26) cmt. 29.

34. For the purposes of this discussion, the distinction between actual and apparent
authority is inconsequential. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore such distinctions.
35.
See, e.g., E. Paul Kovacs & Co. v. Alpert, 429 A.2d 829, 832 (Conn. 1980); 111
Whitney Ave., Inc. v. Comm'r of Mental Retardation, 802 A.2d 117, 124 (Corm. App. Ct.
2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1958).
36. See, e.g., Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123 (1966); McDonald
v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 990 (Wyo. 1991); ; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. c (1981).

37.

The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, 'The Commercial Use of Electronic

Data Interchange-A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 BUS. LAW. 1645,

1649-50 (1990).
38. Writing refers to "printing, typewriting, or any other intentional reduction to tangible
form." U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (1972).
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attempt to deal
with the increasing use of such electronic
39
transmissions.
Nevertheless, borrowing from the provisions of the UETA,
Article 2 now authorizes the formation of contracts for the sale of
goods by interaction with or between electronic agents without the
knowledge or action of an individual. 40 This newly-added provision
was specifically intended to prevent a party from claiming lack of
contractual intent when electronic agents have interacted to form a
contract without human intervention, thereby making it easier to form
contracts electronically.41
With the addition of electronic contracting provisions, Article 2
has effectively retreated from the common law requirement of
contractual intent. Because of these changes to Article 2, binding
contracts of questionable nature can be established between parties
because specific legal effect is given to completed transactions
between two or more non-persons with the capacity to operate
autonomously. Indeed, these dubious contracts may be formed
without even requiring a showing that such parties had any
opportunity for actual involvement in the transaction. Instead,
contractual intent is inferred from the programming and use of the
electronic devices.42 However, as discussed in the following sections
of this article, applying other relevant provisions of Article 2 to an
electronic contracting situation will often render the parties' preprogrammed instructions inoperative.43 Thus, it appears that true
contractual intent has taken a backseat to the need for quick and
economical commercial trading.
In order to truly appreciate the inherent difficulties with
validating contracting between electronic agents, it is helpful to
examine the basic principles of the Law of Agency. An agency is an
agreement between two parties whereby one agrees to allow the other
44
to act on his behalf and the other agrees to act in such a capacity.
The nature of the relationship is such that both parties, the principal
and the agent, have manifested some assent to the creation of the
39. See Theuman, supranote 9.
40. U.C.C. § 2-204(4)(a) (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual
Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
41. Id. § 2-204 cmt. 4.
42. Id. § 2-204 cmt. 5.
43. For example, Section IV.B. of this article describes how pre-printed terms of the
parties' autonomously-generated records may not be included in the resulting contract formed
between the electronic agents.
44.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
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relationship. a It stands to reason that both the principal and agent
must have the capacity to agree to the agency relationship
independent of the control of the other party. For obvious reasons,
the basic tenet of agency law cannot apply to a situation where the
principal is a person or other legal entity and the agent is a computer,
a mere machine, which depends on being programmed by its
purported principal in order to perform any function on behalf of the
principal. Without the independent capacity of the purported agent to
consent to the agency relationship, an agency relationship does not
exist. Thus, the foundation of Article 2's recognition of electronic
agents is faulty. It stands to reason that the fall-out from this faulty
premise will be troublesome.
Even before the drafting of the UETA, legal scholars foresaw
potential problems with contracting by computers.4 6
Others
specifically pointed out that Article 2 in its pre-revision state was
insufficient to deal with electronic commerce.4 7 On one occasion, it
was suggested that a choice had to be made between upholding the
long-standing doctrine of contractual intent and relaxing such
requirements in favor of an implied or indirect intent theory whereby
the mere use of a computer would attribute to the user intent to be
bound by the acts resulting from such use.48 The drafters of the 2003
revisions to Article 2 clearly chose the latter.4 9
While some scholars make the case the computers are no less
capable of possessing intentionality than other nonhuman entities
accorded legal person status, others contend computers lack
intentionality because they do not have the ability to independently
process meanings separate and apart from the instructions of the
operating program.5 ° If the naysayers are correct in their assertions, it
follows that there is no contractual intent imputed to the parties by the
electronic agents' acts.
As now penned, section 2-204 allows for the making of a
contract for the sale of goods in any manner sufficient to show

45. "An agency relation exists only if there has been a manifestation by the principal to
the agent that the agent may act on his account, and consent by the agent so to act." Id. § 15.
46. See, e.g., Allen & Widdison, supra note 16,passim.
47. The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, 'supra note 37, at 1649-50.
48. Allen & Widdison, supra note 16, at 43-44.
49. See U.C.C. § 2-204 cmt. 4 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I.
Annual Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/; id. § 2-212.
50. E.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Legal PersonhoodforArtificial Intelligence, 70 N.C. L.
REv. 1231, 1267 (1990) (discussing the lack of intentionality position in JOHN R. SEARLE,
MINDS, BRAINS & PROGRAMS, 63-70 [19841).
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agreement, and the section includes the interaction of electronic
agents as an example. 5 1 However, the term "agreement" as defined
by the U.C.C. refers to the bargain of the parties in fact.52 "... [T]he
bargain principle itself, rests on the empirical premise that in making
a bargain a contracting party will act with full cognition to rationally
maximize his subjective expected utility. ' 53 The capacity to contract
is measured in terms of a party's ability to purposefully participate in
the bargaining process. 54 Remember, a party is a person, 55 and a
person is an individual or other legal entity. 56 If one follows this
interrelated string of legal principles to its logical conclusion, only an
individual or other legal entity can be a party to a contract. In
addition, that party must have the ability to rationally and cognitively
participate in the contracting process for the protection of his interest.
If physical or mental restraints prevent the actor from participating
rationally or cognitively, the actor lacks capacity to contract.57
However, if the contracting process itself does not afford a party
opportunity for meaningful participation, there is no bargain, and
thus, no agreement.
Revised section 2-204 allows contracting between electronic
agents without the opportunity for human review. Since machines
programmed to function within the predetermined parameters of the
programming parties cannot act rationally or cognitively, the bargain
element of an agreement cannot be satisfied without building into the
process the capacity for human review.
Even more troublesome is the predicted eventuality that
technology will soon produce computers that can learn and produce
autonomous transmissions through artificial intelligence.
While
artificial intelligence is spoken of in many contexts, the term is

51. U.C.C. § 2-204(l) (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual
Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
52. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) (2002).
53. Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REv. 211, 212 (1995).
54.

55.
56.
57.
principal
principal

FARNSWORTH, supranote 30, § 4.2.

U.C.C. § 1-201(26) (2002).
Id. § 1-201(27).
Even though an agent lacks capacity to bind himself to an agreement, he may bind a
who allows the agent to act on his behalf. However, the agent's ability to bind his
is limited by his mental or physical ability to act on behalf of the principal.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 21 cmt. a (1958).

58. This does not suggest that parties are required to actively negotiate or participate in
order to create a valid agreement. It merely suggests that the parties must have the opportunity
todo so.
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generally used to refer to computer programs which generate rules of
production based on principles derived from a given set of
experiences. 59 This contrasts with other types of computer programs
that operate based on a definitive set of pre-programmed
instructions.6 °
Thus, a computer using artificial intelligence
technology is said to be trainable and to learn from experiences. 6' In
this scenario, a computer will simulate the human thought process
through the ability to autonomously modify its instructions and
produce transmissions not contemplated by the human-party
interest. 62 This would be a situation where the electronic agent clearly
does not manifest the intention of the principal since there are no preprogrammed parameters guiding the computer's actions. However,
under revised Article 2, the act of the electronic agent would still be
attributed to the principal.63
In fact, the possibility of artificial intelligence being introduced
to the electronic contracting process is addressed in the official
comments of the UETA, along with an acknowledgement that
appropriate adjustments may be required if and when this eventuality
occurs. 64 Unfortunately, the drafters of the 2003 revisions to Article 2
failed to take this to heart when they opened the door for contracting
between electronic agents.
Tragically, this could be yet another situation in which key
provisions of Article 2 are rendered outdated and useless before the
ink dries on the 2003 revisions.6 5

59.

See Eric Engle, Smoke and Mirrors or Science? Teaching Law with Computers-A

Reply to Cass Sunstein on Artificial Intelligence and Legal Science, 9 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2
(Winter 2002-2003), at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v9i2/Article6.html.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Allen & Widdison, supra note 16, at 27.
63. U.C.C. § 2-212 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual Meeting
May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
64. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 2 cmt. 5 (1999).
65. In this scenario, the parties would be left with the provisions of any applicable
avoidance doctrines, some of which are discussed in Section VII, in order to seek relief from
such acts. It remains to be seen how one goes about arguing that his electronic agent exceeded
its authority to bind him. Equally as interesting is the potential for false claims of artificial
intelligence-spurred transmissions utilized by parties seeking to get out of a bad deal.
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V. ELECTRONIC AGENTS AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

A.

The Framework of the ParolEvidence Rule.

Article 2's parol evidence rule is found in section 2-202.66 This
section provides that certain matters extraneous to the record may not
contradict an agreement set forth in a record if the parties intended the
record to be an integrated agreement, i.e., to represent the final
expression of the parties' agreement regarding the terms in such
record.67 Whether extrinsic materials may be received at all depends
on whether the agreement was integrated, and if so, the degree of such
integration. 68 In attempting to determine whether and to what degree
the agreement was integrated, the courts are solely concerned with the
parties' intent.69 Most courts uniformly dismiss the notion that a
record containing a merger or integration clause 70 is dispositive of the
parties' intent to create an integrated agreement.7' Similarly, the
drafters of the 2003 official revisions to Article 2 specifically
considered and rejected the premise that the presence of an integration
clause is conclusive or presumed to be conclusive evidence of the
parties' intent on this issue.72 To ascertain the parties' intent, the
court will examine factors such as the presence or absence of an
integration clause, whether the parties included any disclaimer
language, the relative sophistication of the parties, and the scope of
prior negotiations, if any. 73 However, as applied to a contract created
between two electronic agents, the parol evidence rule appears to be
an exercise in futility.

66. Although there were a few minor revisions to this code section in the 2003 official
version, the substance of this code section did not change. U.C.C. § 2-202 (Draft of Article 2
Amendments Approved at ALl Annual Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
67. Id.
68. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual
Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org; see, e.g., Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 32
F.3d 1126, 1132 (7th Cir. 1994); FARNSWORTH, supra note 30, § 7.3, at 431.
69. Id.
70. A merger or integration clause states the parties agree that the record contains the
final agreement of the parties on the issues included in the record. See FARNSWORTH, supra
note 30, § 7.3, at 436.
71.
See, e.g., Betaco, 32 F.3d at 1132; FARNSWORTH, supranote 30, § 7.3, at 436.
72. See, U.C.C. § 2-202(b) cmt. 2 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I.
Annual Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
73. See, e.g., Betaco, 32 F.3d at 1132-33.
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B. The ParolEvidence Rule Meets the ElectronicAgents
As mentioned above, section 2-204 now allows formation of a
valid contract between electronic agents without the knowledge of or
need for review by an individual. Suppose a buyer's computer
program is set up to automatically transmit a record of an offer to buy
goods that contains an integration clause. Also, suppose a seller's
computer system is programmed to automatically generate and
electronically transmit acknowledgements and acceptances of
electronic orders received.
However, the seller's acceptance
transmission contains a disclaimer-of-warranty provision, as well as
an integration clause. Upon transmission of the seller's acceptance
record to the buyer, a valid contract would be formed under revised 2204. 74 Moreover, under revised section 2-207, the integration clause
would become a part of the agreement because it appears in both
records.7 5 However, the disclaimer of warranty provision would not
become a part of the contract because there is no matching provision
in the buyer's record. 6 Instead, the warranty provisions of Article 2
would apply pursuant to 2-207(c).
After performance is complete and the goods prove defective,
the seller may rely on the provisions of its electronically transmitted
acceptance purporting to disclaim all warranties. If the buyer makes
an objection based on the parol evidence rule, the court is called upon
to determine if the disclaimer of warranty provision is admissible to
vary the matching terms of the records. If the agreement is found to
be integrated, evidence of the disclaimer clause would be
inadmissible because it contradicts the terms of the agreement created
by the parties' electronic agents, which included the standard
warranty provisions of Article 2.
In spite of the prescribed outcome under the revised Article 2,
one must question whether the parties really intended the agreement,
created by an exchange of automatically generated and electronically
transmitted records, to represent their final agreement of the terms
contained in the record. The seller appears to have a compelling
argument that inclusion of a disclaimer of warranty in his record of

74.
U.C.C. § 2-204 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual Meeting
May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org.
75.

Id. § 2-207.

76. Id.
77. Id. This code section states a contract formed by offer and acceptance includes terms
appearing in both records, to which both parties agree, and those supplied by the U.CC.

2004]

ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING UNDER UCC 2003

333

acceptance is prima facie evidence of a lack of intent that any
resulting agreement without such a disclaimer provision be the final
expression of the terms of such agreement.
Even in the absence of conflicting terms in the electronically
transmitted records, the parties would have an equally compelling
argument that records generated and transmitted electronically by
computers programmed to automatically respond to each other cannot
carry the requisite showing of intent to form an integrated agreement,
especially since the parties have not engaged in any negotiations. In
fact, courts have struggled with the issue of intent to create an
integrated agreement even in situations where the parties themselves
negotiate the terms of the agreement and include specific language
indicating that the agreement represents their full and final
understandings. 78 For the very reason that courts continue to examine
extrinsic evidence in order to ascertain the parties' intent to create an
integrated agreement in such situations, the courts may similarly be
compelled to conclude that agreements made by electronic agents
without review or approval by individuals can never demonstrate an
intent that such agreement be a final expression of the terms of the
agreement.
Logic dictates that when the ability of a human actor to review
and approve is removed from the contract formation process, any
significance given to the perfunctory conduct of the electronic agent
during contract formation is sua sponte nonprobative on the issue of
the parties' intent that the resulting terms, whatever they may be,
constitute their final agreement on such matters. A court would be
hard-pressed to impose upon any party a finding of intent to be bound
by the terms of an agreement he did not have the opportunity to learn
about or approve beforehand, especially when such a finding prevents
the party from introducing extrinsic evidence which would establish
the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement. With
this being the case, a party seeking to invoke the protection of the
parol evidence rule would not be able to establish the requisite
foundational showing of mutual intent that the record be a final
expression of the parties' agreement, and thus, the parol evidence rule
falls on its own sword when confronted with contracting by electronic
agents.
Under the previous version of Article 2, while the trading of
written offers and acceptances could have resulted in the formation of
78. E.g., Betaco, 32 F.3d at 1132; Sierra Diesel Injection Serv., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.,
890 F.2d 108, 112 (9th Cir. 1989); see also, FARNSWORTH, supranote 30, § 7.3, at 436.
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a contract without terms a party included in his form, the parties had
the opportunity to prevent such a result. Under previous section 2207, a party could limit acceptance of his offer to only those terms
contained therein. 79 Also, the recipient party could stipulate that his
acceptance was only effective if the offering party agreed to the new
or different terms contained in his accepting form. 80 Lastly, the
offeror could timely object to any new or different terms contained in
the purported acceptance. 8' When properly invoked, each of these
safeguards assured a party would not find himself bound to a deal
governed by undesired terms. However,; revised Article 2 does not
have such a safety valve. Under revised section 2-207, a party
desiring to contract based on the terms of his record may find himself
bound by a contract without such terms if the other party's record
does not match his terms.82 Also, with the ability to contract through
the interaction of electronic agents, there is no provision to review or
object to non-matching forms in the course of contract formation.
VI. ELECTRONIC AGENTS AND OUTPUT/REQUIREMENTS
CONTRACTS8 3

It is often said that only a specified quantity is needed in order to
84
save a contract for the sale of goods from failing for indefiniteness.
Nevertheless, Article 2 recognizes the validity of contracts for the sale
of goods stated in terms of all the buyer requires or that seller can
supply even though no specific quantity is mentioned. The quantity
term is supplied by the seller's output or the buyer's requirements, as
the case may be.86 These provisions have also survived the 2003
revisions.
The essence of the output and requirements contracts provision
under Article 2 is flexibility in contracting for the sale of goods
without being subject to the rigors of the common law concept of
§ 2-207(2)(a)

79.

U.C.C.

80.

Id. § 2-207(1).

81.

Id. § 2-207(2)(c).

(1996).

82.
U.C.C. § 2-207 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual Meeting
May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.

83. The likelihood of two electronic agents interacting to contract on a requirements or
output basis may seem remote. However, Article 2 unquestionably enables such a transaction.
Thus, the idiosyncrasy of this scenario is ripe for exploration.
84. See, e.g., Indiana - Am. Water Co., Inc. v. Town of Seelyville, 698 N.E.2d 1255,
1259-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); lwtmm, Inc. v. Forest Hills Rest Home, 577 S.E.2d 175, 178
(N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
85.

U.C.C. § 2-306 (1998).

86.

See, e.g., Meyer v. Sandhills Beef, Inc., 318 N.W.2d 863, 866 (Neb. 1982).
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indefiniteness. 87 Checked by the requirement of good faith, this
provision allows parties to shore up commitments for the procurement
88
and supply of goods without specifically stating a quantity.
Nevertheless, the foundation of this provision is the fact that the
buyer's needs are reasonably predictable and thus within the range of
business risk a seller is willing to take. 89 "[E]ven where one party
acts with complete good faith, the section limits the other party's risk
in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the parties. 9 °
Thus, the output and requirement provisions appear to contemplate
some level of human evaluation of the other parties' business
practices in order to ascertain whether an output or requirements
relationship with that particular party is a risk worth taking. The
assumption of human evaluation may also be found in the language of
section 2-306, which prohibits a party from demanding or tendering
quantities unreasonably disproportionate to the estimate stated in the
agreement or if none, a normal or comparable prior output or
requirement. 91
In determining the prior normal or otherwise
comparable output or requirement, section 2-306 is silent on whether
the inquiry was intended to focus on the prior or comparable conduct
of the parties alone or to include relevant industry standards.
However, this provision has routinely been construed as referring
only to prior dealings between to the parties.92 Thus, the code section
reflects a situation where the reasonable expectations of the parties
have been established through negotiations producing an estimate of
the output or requirements or by prior dealings between the parties.
In addition, an output or requirements relationship has been
regarded as a promise of exclusivity, meaning the party receiving the
benefit of flexibility promises to deal with the other party
exclusively. 93 Thus, simply programming a computer to respond to a
pre-described set of parameters would not seem to allow for

87.
Under common law, the failure to include all essential terms renders a contract
unenforceable. See, e.g., Witt v. Realist, Inc., 118 N.W.2d 85, 93-94 (Wis. 1962).
88.

U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 2 (1998).

89.
Id.; see also JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, 2 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 6.5 (rev. ed. 1995).

90. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. v. Ameranda Hess Corp., 397 N.Y.S.2d 814, 819
(N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
91. U.C.C. § 2-306 (1996).
92. See, e.g., Duval & Co. v. Malcolm, 214 S.E.2d 356, 357 (Ga. 1975); Stacy A.
Silkworth, Quantity Variations in Open Quantity Contracts, 51 U. PiTT. L. REV. 235, 242

(1990).
93. E.g., Silkworth, supra note 92, at 247 (citing J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 4-13, at 240 [3d ed. 1987]).
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consideration of whether the parties have had prior dealings, the
normal output or requirements established by such previous dealings,
and whether the party with whom the computer interacts is seeking or
is willing to enter into an exclusive relationship.
Since the hallmark of output and requirements contracts is the
reasonable expectation of the parties at the time of contracting, it
seems illogical to conclude that output and requirements provisions
were intended to be extended to contract formation through the
interaction of electronic agents without having some ability to
evaluate on a case-by-case basis those elements which define the
parties' reasonable expectations.
VII.ELECTRONIc AGENTS AND WAIVERS/MODIFICATIONS

Legal scholars have explored the pitfalls of section 2-209's
modification and waiver provisions on more than one occasion,
offering a variety of suggestions for simplifying the provisions.94 In
fact, several preliminary drafts of the proposed amendments to this
code section demonstrate that a lot of discussion took place regarding
the need for such a revision. 95 Nevertheless, section 2-209 survived
the 2003 revisions essentially intact.96 Accordingly, Article 2 still
allows for waiver of contractual provisions by conduct which is
97
deemed to forego enforcement of rights created by such provisions.
For example, even though section 2-209(2) states that an agreement
may require modifications to be in writing in order to be valid, section
2-209(4) allows a court to find a waiver of the written modifications
only provision by conduct deemed to forego enforcement of the
provision. 98 Thus, a party's assent to or failure to object to a
proffered oral modification effectively waives a provision prohibiting

94. See, e.g., JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
1-6, 52-53 (5th ed. 2000); see also, e.g., Douglas K. Newell, Cleaning Up U.C.C. Section 2209, 27 IDAHO L. REv. 487, 491-500, 503-04 (1990-1991) (suggesting retaining only the first
subsection dealing with modifications and deleting the rest of the section or adding a clear and
convincing burden of proof requirement to the first subsection for claims of oral modifications
and deleting the balance of the section).
95. See A.L.I., U.C.C. § 2-210, notes (Discussion Draft Apr. 14, 1997).
96. The only revisions to this section reflect the recognition of an electronic record in lieu
of the previous requirement of a writing. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments
Approved at A.L.I. Annual Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
97. See id. § 2-209(4).
98. Cf Moe v. John Deere Co., 516 N.W.2d 332, 336 (S.D. 1994) (finding a contractual
right to declare a default upon late payment can be waived by conduct despite an express nonwaiver clause).
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oral modifications.99 The same waiver provision extends to attempted
modifications of agreements required by the Statute of Frauds to be in
writing or some other indicia of a signed record.' 00 Similarly, Article
2 continues to allow modifications of agreements for the sale of goods
without consideration.' 0 '
Previously, the poorly drafted modification and waiver
provisions of section 2-209 posed little threat to the actual intent of
the parties since mutual assent was required in order to trigger such
provisions. 102 Moreover, notions of "knowing and voluntary" still
03
hovered close when determinations of waiver validity were at issue.1
The effect was to regard the parties' agreement as their actual bargain,
including any subsequent conduct assented to or relied upon, without
having the parties hamstrung by technical rules of enforcement.
Now, with the addition of the electronic contracting provisions,
Article 2 would apply the same modification and waiver provisions to
transactions consummated by electronic agents without review or
action by an individual. Thus, the parties' actual intent may be
threatened or displaced by the effect of the actions performed by
electronic agents. A glitch in a buyer's computer programming can
result in subsequent and/or duplicative electronic orders being sent to
and processed by seller's electronic agent.' 0 4 Likewise, it is just as
probable for automated electronic transmissions between electronic
agents to inadvertently modify negotiated agreements between the
actual individuals, either by transmission errors or by inclusion of
boilerplate terms not previously included within the original
negotiated agreement. Since consideration is not required for a valid
modification, and the intent to modify will be gleaned from the
parties' programming of the electronic devices
used, the modification
05
enforceable.'
and
valid
be
well
very
may
To illustrate this point, let us assume Buyer and Seller
telephonically reach an oral agreement for the purchase of certain

99. See U.C.C. § 2-209(4) (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual
Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 2-209(1).
102. E.g., Cambridge Tech., Inc. v. Argyle Indus., Inc., 807 A.2d 125, 135 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2002).
103. E.g., id. at 134.
104.
See Amelia H. Boss, The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act In a Global
Environment, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 275, 344 (2001).

105. Whether the parties will be able to avail themselves of certain avoidance doctrines in
the face of the new electronic provisions is discussed in Section VI.
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materials from Seller for delivery no earlier than three weeks due to
the fact that Buyer's business facilities will not be complete until such
time. Subsequently, Seller's electronic agent initiates an electronic
transmission confirming the purchase order but containing boilerplate
terms which provide for a two-week delivery date and prohibit
modifications without a signed record.
In response, Buyer's
electronic agent generates an acknowledgment agreeing to the terms
of Seller's electronically generated confirmation. Under sections 2204 and 2-209, this would appear to be a valid and enforceable
modification of the parties' oral agreement, despite the fact that the
parties did not intend to effect such a modification.
After the electronic agents trade transmissions, Buyer reviews
the resulting records and notices the discrepancy in the delivery date.
Buyer then immediately telephones Seller to make sure the threeweek delivery date will be honored. Seller orally assures Buyer that
delivery in three weeks will be no problem. Nevertheless, due to
Seller's oversight, Seller's delivery truck arrives with the goods after
only two weeks and demands that Buyer take delivery. Naturally,
Buyer refuses, and Seller subsequently sues Buyer for damages.
The second telephone conversation would appear to be yet
another modification of the unintended result of interaction between
the electronic agents in order to conform to the parties' original
understanding. However, section 2-209(2) appears to prevent Buyer
from referring to the second telephone conversation because it would
attempt to modify a contract containing a written modifications only
provision. Here, the fact that the first modification was effected
without the need or requirement of review or action by an individual
resulted in a situation where the intended bargain is rendered
irrelevant.
Now, let us suppose that artificial intelligence technology
produces the autonomous learning computer previously described in
Section III. The possibility of having an existing agreement modified
by an unsolicited electronic transmission and automatically confirmed
by the electronic agent on the other end without the knowledge of the
principal parties is even greater. This demonstrates the need for some
type of individual involvement in order to avoid unintentional
modifications of contracts.
A possible resolution to the seemingly wide-open allowance of
modifications to unintentionally thwart a contractual relationship
would be to require the two-step showing set forth in the case of Roth
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Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp.'06 that the modification was
spurred by circumstances that would lead a similarly situated
merchant to seek a similar modification and that there is a legitimate
commercial reason for the modification. 10 7 With this requirement,
any unintentional modification would have to be justified in light of
circumstances likely to come to the attention of the parties. This
comports with the long-standing requirement of mutual assent to
modifications.
VIII. ELECTRONIC AGENTS AND AVOIDANCE DOCTRINES

Lastly, we explore the availability of certain avoidance doctrines
to undo any unintentional contractual relationship resulting from the
interaction of electronic agents. Since contracting by electronic
agents effectively dispenses with the bargaining process, it 0is8
probably safe to assume that claims of undue influence and duress'
will not surface in connection with contracts made between electronic
agents. Likewise, although a claim of lack of capacity to contract
may very well be ripe when computers are the sole actors in the
contracting process, the proof stage of this defense would probably
overwhelm most attorneys. Thus, lack of capacity claims probably
will not be asserted.
The official comments to the revised Article 2 provisions
allowing formation of a contract by interaction of electronic agents
specifically preserve the defenses of fraud and mistake. 0 9 However,
when confronted with contracts formed in this manner, the comments
caution courts not to approach such defenses with the same legal
standards applicable to nonelectronic transactions. 0 Two issues
need to be resolved. First, do the general doctrines of fraud and
mistake as we know them lend any assistance in undoing what the
parties did not do or want to be done in the first place? Second, if
courts are not to apply the generally accepted legal standards in
evaluating claims of fraud and mistake in electronically formed
contracts, what standards should be applied?

106. 705 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983).
107. Id. at 145-46.
108. Both of these doctrines involve some type of overreaching during the bargaining
process. See, e.g., Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 128, 130-31
(1966).
109. U.C.C. § 2-204 cmt. 6 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.LI. Annual
Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
110.

Id.
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While examining the common law defenses of fraud and
mistake, it is important to note that such doctrines arose in an era
when contract law required at least two separate persons with the
capacity for free will to agree based on the circumstances surrounding
the bargaining process.
A.

Fraud

The premise upon which relief has been accorded for fraud is
that a party has been deceived during the bargaining process that led
to the contract formation."' In order to establish a claim of fraud, one
must demonstrate that an intentional or material misrepresentation
induced him to assent, and that such assent was in reasonable reliance
on the misrepresentation.' 12
Fraud implies knowledge of the
13
misrepresentation or reckless disregard of the truth of the assertion."
It is not enough that the assertion is false, but the asserting party must
4
also intend to mislead. 1
In the context of pre-programmed computers operating within
prescribed parameters, are we to be concerned about the deceitful
conduct of the programming principals or the electronic agent? If the
programming party utilizes deceitful tactics in the programming
process with knowledge that a responding electronic agent would
transmit a manifestation of assent in response, this is probably a
classic case of fraud.' 15 However, where the programming party
engages in no improper conduct in programming the electronic agent,
must we then focus on the actions of the electronic agent? The
UETA's inclusion of provisions governing the effect of change or
error occurring in the transmission recognizes the likelihood of such
occurrences. 116
This could result in the transmission of a
misrepresentation. Moreover, where the change or error remains
within the predetermined acceptable range of the responding
electronic agent, an automatic electronic response of acceptance will
be generated which ostensibly forms an agreement.

111.

FARNSWORTH, supra note 30, § 4.9.

112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981).
113. Id. § 162(1).
114. Id. § 164 cmt. a; see also Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123,
129 (1966).
115. The classic case of fraud occurs where a party makes a misrepresentation with
knowledge of the falsity of the representation with the intent to induce assent by the other party
and the other party justifiably relies on the misrepresentation in giving his assent. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162, 164 (1981).
116.

Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 10 (1999).
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Once the parties discover the effects of the transmissions
between the electronic agents, will either be able to establish fraud in
order to avoid the contract? Although the transmission error resulted
in a misrepresentation, it is unlikely that a showing of knowledge of
the misrepresentation or intent to defraud can be established where
there is nothing to indicate that the misrepresentation was known to
the sending party at the time of transmission. Certainly, intent and
knowledge are not actions which one can attribute to the computer.
Likewise, the party's lack of intent to deceive
makes it unjust to
7
attribute such intent or knowledge to him. 1
Next, the element of reasonable reliance must be analyzed.
Where the parties leave the task of achieving mutual assent to their
electronic agents with no provisions for human intervention, is it
reasonable to rely on the unread transmissions from an electronic
agent to bind one to a commercial transaction? Unless it can be
shown that reliance was reasonable, a party cannot be accorded relief
in fraud.'18
Thus, the question becomes whether a party can
justifiably rely on a transmission from an electronic agent which is
inherently susceptible to transmission errors. If a reasonable person
should be aware of the possibility of such transmission changes or
errors, then it cannot be said that it is reasonable to rely on the process
of electronic contracting without instituting some type of human
review procedure to guard against unintentional consequences.
Accordingly, in the absence of deceptive conduct by the parties
in the programming stage, the doctrine of fraud does not appear to
provide relief from an agreement formed through the interaction of
electronic agents.
B. Mistake
119
"A mistake is a belief that is not in accord with the facts."
Where there is a material misconception about a basic assumption
upon which the contract was based, a party may be allowed to avoid
the contract. 120 The relevant time for the inquiry of what the parties
believed is at the time of contracting.121 Accordingly, the foundation

117.
It should be noted that a material misrepresentation, albeit not fraudulent, may be
sufficient to bypass this element. However, the reliance issues would nevertheless apply. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 163, 164 (1981).
118.

See, e.g., Norton v. Poplos, 443 A.2d 1, 6 (Del. 1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

CONTRACTS § 164 (1981).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (1981).
120.

Id. § 152(1).

121.

Id.
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of this doctrine appears to be an inquiry into the state of mind of the
parties at the time of contracting.
Where parties are engaged in contracting by the interaction of
electronic agents, the time of contracting appears to be the time when
the responding electronic agent performs the accepting electronic
transmission, as attributed to the parties. 122 In most cases, only the
electronic agents operating independently of any involvement by an
individual would contain information regarding the actual details of
the transaction at the time it is being performed. This is especially
true since section 2-204 allows formation of a contract when no
individual is aware of the electronic agents' actions.' 23 Thus, can it be
said that the electronic agents have "beliefs?"'' 24 It is doubtful that
even the true supporters of artificial intelligence would characterize
the autonomous learning and operating capabilities of the smart
computers as a "belief." Moreover, whether the principal parties
should be deemed to have any belief as to the existence of facts at a
time when they do not necessarily know that a contract is being
formed is a question the courts will have to address in the course of
examining the applicability of this doctrine to contracting between
electronic agents.
But, there is a more basic concern regarding the applicability of
the mistake doctrine to contracting between electronic agents. In
contract law, there are two categories of mistake: mutual 25 and
unilateral. 126 In order to be accorded relief from a contract under
either category or mistake, the requesting party must demonstrate,
among other things, he did not bear the risk of the mistake.127 A party
will bear the risk of mistake when the party is aware that he has
limited knowledge of the relevant facts but proceeds anyway or when
the risk is allocated to him by the agreement or the court where the
28
surrounding circumstances indicate it is reasonable to do so.

122.

See U.C.C. §§ 2-204(4)(b), 2-212, 2-213 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved

at A.L.I. Annual Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
123. U.C.C. § 2-204(4)(a) (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual
Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
124. A belief is commonly defined as acceptance by the mind that something is true or
real. E.g., MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 104 (10th ed. 1999).

125.

Both parties share the same misconception about a basic fact or assumption upon

which their bargain is based. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981).

126. Only one party has a misconception about a basic fact or assumption upon which the
bargain is based. Id. § 153.
127. Id.§§ 152, 153.
128.

Id.§ 154 (1981).
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Let us return to the UETA provisions acknowledging the
possibility of changes and errors occurring during electronic
transmissions. 29 For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume
such changes and errors rise to the level of a mutual mistake, i.e. a
shared misconception about the state of the facts. Obviously, any
party who chooses to engage in contracting through the interaction of
electronic agents is proceeding with knowledge that in all likelihood
he will not know that a contract is being formed, not to mention the
actual terms of the contract. It can further be said that use of
electronic agents in light of the possibility of transmission changes
and errors without building into the process a mechanism for review
and approval by an individual is tantamount to conscious ignorance.
Overlooking the possibility of conscious ignorance, is this
nevertheless a situation where the courts will allocate the risk of
mistake to the party requesting relief? After all, the 2003 revisions
specifically provide that unknown actions of electronic agents will be
attributed to the parties. 130 Proceeding in the face of such a provision
may be viewed by a court as a circumstance in which it is reasonable
to allocate the risk of mistake to one or more of the parties.
Such a construction by the court would be consistent with longstanding treatment of cases involving transmission errors. For
instance, in Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 13' an offer sent by
telegram omitted a part of the price term, resulting in the offeree
manifesting acceptance based on a price far below that intended by
the offeror. The court determined that the transmission error was
caused by the telegraph company and not any fault of either party."
However, the court determined that the person selecting the telegraph
as a means of communication should bear the loss of the transmission
error. In this regard, the court noted, "[t]he use of the telegraph has
become so general, and so many transactions are based on the words
of the telegram received, that any other rule would now be
33
impracticable."1
Accordingly, the doctrine of mistake as we know it does not
appear to relieve a party of a contract formed by the interaction of
electronic agents, despite the presence of transmission errors.

129.

Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 10 (1999).

130.
U.C.C. §§ 2-204(4)(a), 2-212 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I.
Annual Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
131.

10 A. 495 (Me. 1887).

132.

Id. at 496.

133.

Id. at 497.
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C. Guidelinesfor TailoringAvoidance Doctrines to Electronic
Transactions.
There is a real possibility that the severe issues created by the
new electronic contracting provisions will be beyond repair through
the general application of key avoidance doctrines. Nevertheless, the
official comments to such provisions suggest that courts should
consider the differences between electronic contracting and
nonelectronic contracting when fashioning appropriate standards for
applying certain avoidance doctrines. 134 Unfortunately, the comments
do not give the courts any guidance in determining how to go about
tailoring the doctrines to fit electronic contracting situations. Thus,
the courts will be left to their own devices to determine how to deal
with unintended outcomes of contracts created by actions of
electronic agents. In the end, the absurdities and inconsistencies
flowing from unbridled approaches by the courts will serve no other
purpose than to answer in the negative a question posed close to a
decade before the 2003 revisions were approved, to wit, whether the
current state of contract law is equipped to deal
with technology of
35
individuals.'
by
involvement
contracting without
IX. CONCLUSION
I offer a few suggestions in order to facilitate the recognition of

electronic contracting against the backdrop of current contract law.
The main source of the potential conflict created by electronic
contracting is the newly added provision in section 2-204 allowing the
formation of contracts by the interaction of electronic agents without
the knowledge of any individual.136 As discussed above, the absence
of some mechanism whereby an individual using due diligence could
learn of and review the actions of the electronic agents beforehand
poses several problems with the underlying notion of contractual
intent. Accordingly, the easiest way to resolve this conflict is to
amend Article 2 by deleting this provision but leaving intact the
provision allowing contracting by the interaction of an electronic

134.
U.C.C. § 2-204 cmt. 6 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual
Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
135.

Allen & Widdison, supra note 16, at 27.

136.
U.C.C. § 2-204(4)(a) (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual
Meeting May 13, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/.
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agent and an individual. 137 This would ensure involvement by an
individual on at least one side of the bargain.
Moreover, an even cleaner method would be to require, or at
least enable, interaction or review of the electronic contracting
process on the accepting end. This would serve two purposes: first,
the programming party for the initiating electronic agent would still
have the advantage of enjoying the capability of automatic ordering;
second, the accepting party has an opportunity to review the terms
proposed by the automatic transmission of the offeror's electronic
agent. If the terms are agreeable, there is a meeting of the minds. If
the terms are not agreeable, the individual acting on behalf of the
offeree may decline.
This comports with the long-standing
requirements of mutual assent and contractual intent. Moreover,
when the much anticipated artificial intelligence propelled computer
is developed, the mechanism to deal with it will already be in place.
Finally, the most expedient manner of dealing with the chaos
created by the clash between electronic commerce and the current
state of contract law is to provide a mechanism whereby the parties
first establish the terms by which they agree to conduct electronic
transactions.
A study conducted by the Electronic Messaging
Services Taskforce of the American Bar Association concluded that
the pre-revision version of the U.C.C. was inadequate to safeguard
parties' expectations in an electronic transaction for the sale of goods,
and thus suggested the use of a master agreement between the parties
until such time as the138U.C.C. is appropriately amended to deal with
electronic commerce.
The model agreement proposed by the taskforce is premised on
the fact that the parties should mutually agree on the use of electronic
transmissions to communicate, as well as the terms and conditions
which will govern their electronic sales transactions. 39 This serves
the dual purpose of ensuring that parties mutually agree beforehand to
engage in electronic commerce, as also contemplated by the UETA,
as well as ensuring that the parties do not find themselves bound to a
transaction which does not include the terms and conditions each
party's automated electronic transmission would otherwise propose.
Moreover, the model agreement allows the parties to build into the
contracting process human review and approval at specified stages or
simply for unusual requests, as well as to specify what acts will
137.
138.
139.

See id. § 2-204(4)(b).
The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, 'supra note 37, at 1649-50, 1665.
Id. at 1699.
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constitute acceptance. 140 This provides the ability to ensure mutual
and certain agreement on the terms of the electronic transaction. 141
The model agreement proposed by the task force was intended as
a stopgap to enable electronic commerce while Article 2 was
undergoing revisions.142 However, in light of the fact that the 2003
revisions did not remedy the concerns about assuring legal
enforcement of electronic contracts, it is appropriate to continue to
provide a mechanism for certainty and enforceability in electronic
commerce until such time as the U.C.C. is sufficiently revamped.

140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id. at 1735, Model Agreement § 2.3 cmt. 1.
The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, supra note 37.

